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This piece continues my efforts to identify the link between the Philosophical 
Investigations’ (PI) criss-cross form and its conception of philosophy and 
philosophical methods. In my ‘The Philosophical Investigations and Syncretistic 
Writing’ (2013) I established a connection between the PI’s criss-cross form and 
Wittgenstein’s saying that philosophy proper is like ‘Dichtung’. In this chapter I 
link the criss-cross form with the PI’s conception of the example and the central 
role it receives in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I contrast the PI’s conception of 
philosophy with a conception that is guided by a scientistic approach and regards 
philosophical problems as somewhat similar to normal science puzzles. While this 
approach is prominent nowadays, it is not a conception shared by the PI. Rather, it 
is exactly this approach that the PI opposes with its criss-cross form. I hold that the 
radical nature of the PI’s form has largely gone unnoticed in Wittgenstein 
reception, including among scholars who regard Wittgenstein as a ‘therapeutic’ 
philosopher. As in my 2013 paper, here too I refer to Ortner’s (2000) description of 
writing strategies as a valuable tool for identifying working strategies and turning 
points in Wittgenstein’s formation of the PI, especially ‘linear step-by-step’, 
‘syncretistic’ and ‘puzzle’ writing.  
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1. ‘… we now demonstrate a method, by examples’ (PI, §133) 
 
The Philosophical Investigations (PI) stresses the role of the example in 
philosophy, and its procedure is itself intimately tied up with the example: from the 
very beginning, it puts specific examples of language use (philosophical, imaginary 
and everyday) at the center of philosophical attention. It argues for the fundamental 
position the example has in the learning and teaching of language and other 
activities: we learn by example, and even elementary concepts such as regularity 
(elementary for learning itself!) can be learnt by example (PI, §208). It reflects 
upon examples of how and how not to do philosophy; it wants to demonstrate apt 
philosophical methods by example itself (PI, §133).1 The example achieved such 
central significance only in the works of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, such as 
The Big Typescript, The Blue Book, The Brown Book and the PI.2 
The PI is generally considered the masterpiece of Wittgenstein’s mature 
philosophy. But, if the example is at the center of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: 
why is it then the PI rather than The Brown Book that is considered Wittgenstein’s 
masterpiece? Isn’t The Brown Book, far more than the PI, a book of examples in 
philosophy, and furthermore a book only of examples? And isn’t The Brown Book, 
together with The Blue Book, also much clearer than the PI, since it is discursive 
rather than aphoristic (Glock, 1996, p.23)? Shouldn’t that count in favor of The 
Brown Book? Many reasons can be given for why one refers to the PI rather than 
The Brown Book as the most authoritative expression of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. The reason I will give here still has to do with Wittgenstein’s focus on 
the example, but also with the fact that in his PI he practices philosophy differently 
than in The Brown Book. This makes the PI less ‘clear’ than The Brown Book and 
breaks up the latter’s linear series of examples and reflections in favor of a 
seemingly loose sequence of small and less connected investigations. 
Why exactly did Wittgenstein change from The Brown Book to the PI? To 
answer this question, one meaning of ‘example’ is crucially relevant: 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical book was itself to be an example for imitation, 
something exemplary, a ‘Vorbild’. Clearly, here lies one of the issues that the 
author of the PI must have had with The Brown Book: while the examples of The 
Brown Book as such may have been fine, the form of the book apparently was not. 
The Brown Book aspired to linearity, but philosophy – according to the PI preface – 
needed a criss-cross rather than a linear form. Thus, in the eyes of the PI author, 
The Brown Book had not given the right example of how to do philosophy – how to 
form philosophy. The right form would be criss-cross rather than linear. It has been 
argued that the PI’s criss-cross form resulted from personal shortcomings rather 
than deliberate choice: that Wittgenstein was not capable of writing in ways other 
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than ‘just’ criss-cross (Hilmy, 1987, p.22). But on this view it becomes difficult to 
see why the form which on its own terms must be considered the better one, 
namely The Brown Book’s linear form, in November 1936 was ‘fragmented’ and 
abandoned in favor of the criss-cross form (Pichler, 2004). Was Wittgenstein not 
capable of writing linearly, or did he no longer want to? Did he himself not regard 
it as the better form? One aim of this chapter is to show that Wittgenstein actually 
was capable of a great many writing forms, including linear and criss-cross ones. 
My view is that, since Wittgenstein was capable of both the linear and the criss-
cross forms, the fact that for the PI he chose the criss-cross must be taken as 
significant. Linear and criss-cross writing, and their significance for philosophy, 
will be at the center of this chapter, as will a third writing form that the Austrian 
linguist Hanspeter Ortner (2000) calls ‘puzzle writing’. Ortner regards Wittgenstein 
as a paradigmatic ‘puzzle writer’. Linear and puzzle writing stand close to each 
other, while the criss-cross contrasts with both. That these three writing forms are 
interesting, not only as forms of writing, but also as forms of doing philosophy, will 
be one of my main points, and is also one of the points of Wittgenstein’s preface to 
the PI.3 
I have argued previously (Pichler, 2013) that the form of the PI is, in 
Ortner’s terminology, best described as syncretistic, or, in the words of the PI, as 
‘criss-cross’. In this chapter, I connect the criss-cross form to the PI’s attention to 
the example as something that is central to philosophy, and to its ambition of giving 
itself the right example not only in terms of content but also in terms of form. 
While Ortner considers Wittgenstein a representative of ‘puzzle writing’, I identify 
an opposition between ‘puzzle writing’ and criss-cross writing, and see in this 
opposition one of the principles behind the formation of the PI. I will use Ortner’s 
description of ‘puzzle writing’ to uncover a conception of philosophy that is 
standard and also seems compatible with The Brown Book, but that is challenged 
and opposed precisely through the PI’s criss-cross form. It is the PI conception of 
philosophy that is non-standard and difficult to agree with. Still, it is this specific 
conception and form that Wittgenstein has left us as his legacy in philosophy, 
whether we find it acceptable or not. 




2. ‘… this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every 
direction’ (PI, Preface) 
 
What was the state of Wittgenstein’s writing in November 1936 when he 
abandoned the Brown Book project4 and embarked on what became the PI? To 
answer this question I allow myself to be guided by Hanspeter Ortner, who in his 
Schreiben und Denken (2000) identifies ten main writing strategies 
(‘Schreibstrategien’): (1) writing in one go; (2) writing one idea in one text version; 
(3) writing one idea in several text versions; (4) writing, through several text 
versions, out one idea and developing it into several new ideas; (5) initial planning 
and subsequent writing out of the plan; (6) writing down of text-externally 
elaborated results; (7) linear step-by-step writing; (8) syncretistic writing; (9) 
writing of parts; (10) puzzle writing (‘Puzzle-Schreiben’).5 Which is the writing 
strategy Wittgenstein adopts for his new work, the PI? It is syncretistic writing 
(strategy 8) that is most characteristic of the writing process that led to the PI, and it 
is also the syncretistic that features most prominently in the PI (Pichler, 2013). But 
in order to let the syncretistic come through, Wittgenstein first had to let go of the 
strategy that had formed The Brown Book, both as a strategy for writing (the 
production process) and as a strategy for organizing the written (the product, and 
thus also the reading). This was linear step-by-step writing (strategy 7) following 
the motto Don’t deviate from the main line. Its basic idea is: first a, then b, then c – 
don’t do c before you have done b, and if a, b and c are your main concern, do them 
first of all. If the treatment of a philosophical problem suggests addressing the 
issues a, b, c, and addressing b involves addressing x which in turn relates to y, then 
the author of The Brown Book may of course also address x but may stop there or 
not go much into x, in order to rush back to the main line of discourse and go on 
with c. Such a procedure and discipline is far from unfamiliar to academics, but 
rather the norm. But not so, it seems, for the author of the PI: he shows no 
hesitation in deviating from the ‘main line’ and treating both x and y. For him, it 
may even become contestable which strand is the ‘main line’, and whether there is 
one. The structure of The Brown Book is a series of language-games which are 
introduced in order to illuminate part by part and step by step one field of language 
after the other. The series starts with the builders’ game, introducing names and 
ostensive teaching, and more complexities in terms of kinds of words and usage are 
added. The language-games are objects of comparison for our everyday language, 
and general reflections are interpolated between them. At several places the author 
sees that related topics are knocking at the door, though it is not yet ‘their turn’. 
Their treatment is postponed or dropped. We are all familiar with linear step-by-
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step writing and formation from academic contexts (and usually favor it), but it is 
actually left behind when Wittgenstein begins his PI in November 1936. 
Although all strategies up to strategy 7 (except maybe strategy 1) involve 
production or process division, they do not, according to Ortner, involve much 
product division. They manage not only to envision but also to produce a relatively 
coherent and intact whole. Strategies 8–10 work differently: syncretistic writing is, 
both on macro and micro levels, characterized by a great number of simultaneous 
‘building sites’ with hardly anything completed, but some structures begun here 
and others already far progressed over there, and with a second floor already in the 
making although its foundations have barely been sketched out.6 Syncretistic 
strategy contrasts primarily with linear writing, but also with ‘parts writing’ 
(strategy 9) and ‘puzzle writing’ (strategy 10). Parts writing is moderately product-
dividing, but already a writing of parts rather than of a whole. However, the whole 
is still presupposed, although not present; there are still enough parts being 
produced to see and to let a whole be seen. Puzzle writing is, then, really a writing 
of parts only, and does so in a way that the whole is no longer visible: division 
reaches a level which also dissolves the wholeness of the product, not only of the 
process. Although the whole is still presupposed here too, the vision of it 
disappears, and we are left with an extreme kind of product division. Ortner 
considers Wittgenstein a puzzle writer par excellence (2000, p.544ff), and he 
describes him, including and especially as the author of the PI, almost exclusively 
as such. According to Ortner, even if Wittgenstein may have aimed at an integrated 
and whole text, he was not able to achieve his objective, and no whole is derivable 
from the parts which Wittgenstein was able to deliver. It is important that we see 
the contrasts that syncretistic writing has with puzzle writing and with linear 
writing. It is these contrasts that translate into different approaches towards how to 
write philosophy. Puzzle writing and linear writing can be seen to be allies, while 
syncretistic writing stands in opposition to them both. Before reflecting further on 
the differences between syncretistic writing on the one hand and linear and puzzle 
writing on the other, we should go through Ortner’s full list of writing strategies 
and see how they apply to Wittgenstein, and especially to his writing of the PI. 
Using Ortner’s list as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI, §122) lets us see that there is a 
variety of writing forms and strategies in Wittgenstein, and that he cannot be said to 
be making use of just one strategy or following only one scheme. Wittgenstein is a 
writer who utilizes different strategies in different contexts and for different 
purposes. Therefore, it becomes even more important to acknowledge that he, for 
the writing of the PI, settled on a specific one, namely syncretistic/criss-cross 
writing. I will from now on prefer talk of ‘criss-cross’ rather than ‘syncretistic’ 
writing, ‘criss-cross’ being Wittgenstein’s own term (PI preface). 
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One of the most fundamental writing strategies is writing ‘in one go’ 
(strategy 1, ‘Schreiben in einem Zug’, Ortner, 2000, ch.2). It is writing which is 
non-disjointed and non-disjoining, and carried through in one phase and one layer. 
Disposition and planning, interruption, stock-taking, pausing, revision and parallel 
processing are all alien to this strategy, and the writer tries to avoid them; what is 
sought and practiced is the free flow of idea and pen. There seems to be little of 
such writing in Wittgenstein’s philosophical work. By and large, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical ‘Bemerkungen’ (his short ‘remarks’, separated from each other by 
one or more blank lines) are already subjected in the first writing stage to insertion, 
deletion, overwriting, rearrangement, multi-versioning and other acts alien to this 
strategy. When writing philosophy, Wittgenstein typically pauses, jumps, is 
recursive, puts a focus on a detail here and sketches a first draft there (‘coming 
back to this later’), thus adopting strategies that make his writing disjointed rather 
than flowing, with the writer reflecting on both process and product. Nevertheless, 
there are texts that have been produced in this way: without much ‘Sofortrevision’ 
(immediate revision, see Boetius, 1971, p.243), as complete first expressions of an 
idea or thought, with a beginning and an end, and only in the second and later 
stages (if at all) becoming the subject of revision and correction. I am here thinking 
of Wittgenstein’s writing of remarks of a personal nature, but also of remarks 
dealing with matters of culture, religion, history, art and metaphilosophy (as also 
entered into the PI, e.g. the last sentence of PI, §133); hence, mostly aphoristic 
remarks of which a selection was published by Georg Henrik von Wright in 
Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977)/Culture and Value (1980): these usually exist 
only in one version and seem to have been more or less produced ‘in one go’. 
With the next strategies, we embark on writing forms where division of 
either process or product enters the field as a parameter: writing can proceed from 
one idea to one text (strategy 2) or multiple texts (strategy 3); or from one idea to 
several texts, and from there again to further ideas (strategy 4). Division of either 
process or product characterizes, according to Ortner, all of the strategies except 
strategy 1. With strategy 2, the division is still of a moderate kind, but with it we 
nevertheless find ourselves in the terrain of at least potentially multiple relations 
between idea and text: here the potential gap between the idea and the text/text 
version is already an issue. Such writing has a conscious progression from one idea 
to one written text, with an awareness of the possibility that other ways of writing 
out the idea also exist. Most of Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing, including the 
remarks that made it into the PI, can be characterized as products of strategy 3 and, 
even more, strategy 4: as writing which proceeds from one idea to several text 
versions, or writing which develops several new ideas from the process of writing 
down one idea into several text versions. Such writing is employed by a writer who 
values and capitalizes on the process of correction and revision for the further 
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development of thoughts: the writer who heuristically develops new knowledge 
through the activity of revision (‘Typ des Text-aus-den-Korrekturen-Entwicklers’, 
Ortner, 2000, ch.3.1.3). Wittgenstein definitely used to revise a lot, and he 
continuously wrote new and alternative versions of his remarks, including in the 
production of the PI (Pichler, 1996). He could develop one tiny and seemingly 
innocent idea by revising and versioning it into a number of texts, and hence to a 
number of new and competing ideas. 
Although Wittgenstein primarily seemed to work through texts and different 
text versions, at the same time he could not do entirely without any preexisting and 
preconfiguring idea, without some planning – according to Ortner, hardly any 
writer can do without (p.415). There are traces of planning for Wittgenstein’s 
writing of the PI too, including the lists in MS 152 (pp.41, 45, 55, 75, 81, 96) where 
he planned part of the sequence and selection of remarks for the PI. There are also 
earlier examples of planning in the Nachlass. Wittgenstein followed a plan when, 
from remarks originally written in the First World War diaries MSS 101–103, he 
composed MS 104 (‘Proto-Tractatus’). Another example occurred around 1932, 
when he divided typescripts produced since 1930 into cuttings consisting of single 
remarks or groups of such remarks and rearranged them. In TS 212, he has 
collected them in bundles and interpolated additional sheets with handwritten 
headings and subheadings. Where each single cutting was to go was recorded on 
the cuttings with letters and numbers (Rothhaupt, 2008, ch.13.2). In The Big 
Typescript, TS 213, this plan was carried out by dictation, producing a typescript of 
more than 750 pages. From the PI preface we know that at different times 
Wittgenstein had different plans for the work which became the PI. We also know 
from the preface that he struggled to follow and carry out these plans. He felt that 
his thoughts ‘were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction 
against their natural inclination’ (PI, Preface). Nevertheless, planning at least 
occasionally had a crucial and positive function for Wittgenstein too. We can say 
that planning was put to work at those moments when Wittgenstein was heading for 
a work, maybe even a publication, in contrast to those phases when he was just 
working on remarks which at some point might become (part of) a work. So the 
criss-cross form of the PI must also be regarded as a result of planning. 
Ortner refers to studies of Hermann Hesse which present Hesse as someone 
who only writes down what he had prepared separately from any work on paper 
(2000, p.462). If these studies are right, then Hesse is a case of text-external 
elaboration that is followed by subsequent writing down (strategy 6). This type of 
writer does not need paper in order to develop their narratives and reflections, and 
writing for them seems to be little more than ‘Niederschreiben’ (writing down). 
Such writing, if it is to be successful, presupposes that the subject to be written 
about is already under control before the writing act, that one’s approach to it is 
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settled in detail before the writing act, and that the form of the writing is decided 
before the writing act. Even if such writing may seem rather far removed from 
Wittgenstein’s case, with Wittgenstein too there are cases of text-external 
elaboration with subsequent writing down: solitary thinking, egocentric speech 
(ibid., p.548f), dialogue with someone else, or the act of reflected and critical 
reading.7 During the First World War at the front, it would only be at moments that 
Wittgenstein had the time to devote himself to continuous writing, although a 
thought and an argument could strike him anywhere, even when on service. In the 
early days of his return to philosophy in Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein used to 
go for long walks with F.P. Ramsey during which they discussed philosophy, and 
only subsequently would the results from such shared thinking make it onto paper, 
namely into (notebooks for) MSS 105–108, the first four ‘Volumes’. Later, 
Wittgenstein would have sustained conversations with Francis Skinner, certainly 
also before writing. Around 1943 (von Wright, 1986, p.126), he reread the 
Tractatus with Nicholas Bachtin , and as a consequence of this he came to the 
conclusion that the PI should be published together with, and clearly marked as 
opposed to, the Tractatus (MS 128,52[2]). 
In this section I have tried to show that, while Ortner himself describes and 
classifies Wittgenstein almost exclusively as a specimen of the puzzle writer, 
Ortner’s overall description and analysis helps to show a range of writing strategies 
at work in Wittgenstein. I myself have proposed syncretistic writing as the best 
model for describing Wittgenstein’s writing, at least as far as the writing of the PI 
is concerned, and contrast the PI’s criss-cross writing with both linear writing and 
puzzle writing. I consider it significant that for the PI Wittgenstein chose the criss-
cross strategy, and view its opposition to linear and puzzle writing as a central 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s formation of the PI. In the next section I will discuss in 
some more detail Ortner’s assessment of Wittgenstein as a puzzle writer and argue 
that it is contestable. This should come as no surprise since I have already said that 
I consider Wittgenstein’s writing of the PI as being syncretistic rather than puzzle 
writing. What may be surprising is that I find Ortner’s classification of 
Wittgenstein as a puzzle writer, though not correct with regard to the realities of 
Wittgenstein’s writing, correct with regard to the standard perception of 
Wittgenstein. Ortner functions as an eye-opener and tells us something significant 
not only about the view we have of Wittgenstein, but also the view we have of the 
functions and nature of philosophical writing more generally. But I will argue that 
it is exactly these, Ortner’s and our views of writing and philosophy, that (while 
they are standard) are strongly challenged and opposed by Wittgenstein through his 
choosing criss-cross rather than linear and puzzle writing. 
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3. ‘…the typical Western scientist does not understand the spirit in which I 
write’ (CV, p.9e) 
 
According to Ortner, Wittgenstein’s situation when writing the PI can be 
understood as follows: Wittgenstein’s field of research is like a huge jigsaw puzzle, 
and Wittgenstein is successful in finding and properly arranging some of the pieces 
of that puzzle. But he still lacks many of them, and for some of the ones which he 
has found, he does not yet know their place. Parts of the puzzle are in place, but 
they are too few to show what the overall picture will look like. In the end, 
Wittgenstein’s puzzle was never completed. Ortner’s main explanation for 
Wittgenstein’s puzzle writing is that Wittgenstein had set himself the task of 
representing such a large landscape of knowledge that it became impossible for him 
to achieve an overview, maybe impossible for anyone. We can consider this the 
part of Ortner’s explanation which invokes a fundamentum in re. But Ortner also 
invokes the personal-shortcoming argument: Wittgenstein was not able to do better 
because of deficient writing capacities (2000, p.546). Ortner sees substantial 
support for his interpretation in Wittgenstein’s autobiographical complaints about 
the difficulty of bringing his ideas into a clear, linear and coherent form. According 
to Ortner, looking at Wittgenstein as a puzzle writer helps us to understand why 
Wittgenstein did certain things and, furthermore, why he did certain things in an 
excessive manner: as a puzzle writer, Wittgenstein had to continuously see where 
and how a certain single remark fitted in; he was preoccupied with finding out 
which parts of the field could be put together from the pieces already available. 
This fits with Wittgenstein’s continuous versioning, arranging and rearranging 
(strategies 2–4). Ortner’s diagnosis and description of Wittgenstein as a puzzle 
writer may seem convincing. Not only is it in tune with our general understanding 
of knowledge as derived from the sciences – knowledge is acquired cumulatively, 
with new pieces being added to already existing bodies of knowledge after they 
have been tested and found compatible. It also appears to be supported by some of 
Wittgenstein’s autobiographical remarks and some facts about the Nachlass, such 
as the fact that it contains a substantial collection of ‘leftover’ cuttings (TS 233), 
and that Wittgenstein’s writing and composition work typically produced such 
leftovers (one may think of them as leftovers due to a lack of consistency or 
coherence with the rest). With the puzzle picture, Ortner seems capable of offering 
an explanation for many lacunae in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. With this picture, he 
also seems to successfully address and utilize one of Wittgenstein’s key notions: 
Übersichtlichkeit (PI, §122), overview, perspicuous (re)presentation. The task of 
philosophy is to achieve Übersicht, an overview of (at least a part of) our language. 
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But is the classification and description of Wittgenstein’s PI as a piece of 
puzzle writing adequate? As much as it may seem convincing, I find it wrong. 
Wittgenstein was, as I have tried to show in the previous section, capable of many 
writing strategies that are at odds with puzzle writing, including planning (strategy 
5) and linear writing (strategy 7). But this is not the important point; what is more 
important seems to me to be the following: from the perspective of the author of the 
PI and his preface, the situation is not that he was incapable of producing a 
completed puzzle, but rather that he must have thought there was, in philosophy, no 
such completeness to be produced, or, at least, when writing the PI, no longer 
thought there was. Rather, he thought it would be misleading to behave as though 
there was. Against this background, it makes sense to think that Wittgenstein’s 
insight that there is no puzzle-whole to be produced must have left a fundamental 
mark on the production of the PI, and that this work was formed by this insight. 
This is the issue which I think lies at the heart of the trouble with Ortner’s 
categorization of Wittgenstein: when arriving at the view that Wittgenstein is a 
puzzle writer, Ortner is actually imposing a standard for Wittgenstein’s writing 
which is in conflict with Wittgenstein’s own understanding of what he is doing. 
Ortner is not just describing Wittgenstein’s actual writing habits. When using the 
writing-is-writing-of-a-complete-whole model as a benchmark, one cannot see the 
PI other than as a failure. A realistic alternative, however, is to question this 
standard as such. The fact that Ortner classifies Wittgenstein as a puzzle writer is 
due to the specific normative writing model which Ortner presupposes. Ortner, in 
his description of Wittgenstein, is biased by exactly the view of writing which is 
dominant in scholarship today: good writing consists in producing a coherent and 
consistent whole through linear and step-by-step procedure. But this is not all: the 
baggage Ortner brings into his discussion of Wittgenstein includes not only a 
standard for what good writing is, but also a related specific standard for 
philosophy, and he tacitly ascribes to Wittgenstein the acceptance of this standard. 
Consequently, where Wittgenstein does not match this standard, Ortner regards it 
as a failure of Wittgenstein rather than as a matter of standards that may be 
different. But quite the contrary is the case: it is one of the PI’s primary tasks to 
oppose this very standard, and to defend and promote an alternative to it. This, as 
Wittgenstein sees and remarks in the PI preface, is grounded in the nature of 
philosophical problems which ‘compels us to travel over a wide field of thought 
criss-cross in every direction’. It is not that it is impossible for Wittgenstein to 
complete the puzzle because the area to be represented is too big for him (and 
because, additionally, he has some personal shortcomings), but because he does not 
believe there is a pregiven puzzle to begin with for philosophy to put together. 
Consequently, the failure which Ortner identifies in Wittgenstein is a failure based 
on premises which Wittgenstein does not accept.  
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Now, though the conception of philosophy which Ortner tacitly presupposes is not 
shared by Wittgenstein, and particularly not by his PI, it is of course standard. 
Ortner’s diagnosis of Wittgenstein is in fact a good exemplification of the problem 
which academic philosophy has with Wittgenstein. Our conception of philosophy is 
at odds with Wittgenstein’s. In fact, Ortner’s description allows us to formulate the 
challenge which Wittgenstein poses for us in even clearer terms: Ortner represents 
Wittgenstein as someone who aspires to achieve, piece by piece and using a puzzle 
procedure, a coherent and consistent view of a preexisting whole, but who fails to 
do so. On the other side we have Wittgenstein, who opposes not only exactly this 
understanding of what he is doing, but an understanding of philosophy along these 
lines as such. Thus, where Ortner sees Wittgenstein as failing according to certain 
standards, Wittgenstein in the PI attacks and questions these very standards: in 
Wittgenstein’s own understanding, it is not his writing practice and achievements 
(or non-achievements) that are at fault, but the standard which is used to identify 
and measure them. Wittgenstein himself certainly thought that the PI was in many 
respects far from as good as it should be, but that does not mean that it was the PI’s 
non-linearity and non-wholeness which weren’t good. 
I have shown how Wittgenstein’s overall writing can be said to exemplify 
many more of Ortner’s writing strategies than puzzle writing alone, including very 
standard ones such as linear and systematic writing. I have argued that Wittgenstein 
settled for his PI on a strategy, criss-cross writing, that is opposed to the most 
standard strategy of all, linear-discursive writing. An important question for us now 
is: how is criss-cross strategy related to the central role of examples in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and to his reflections on the nature of the example? If 
examples are at the center of Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy and thus deserve 
the best treatment, why should a criss-cross strategy be more apt than linear 
discursive writing, or indeed more so than any strategy that aims to represent a 
whole out of its parts? What do the focus on examples and the criss-cross form 
have to do with each other? What does the use of examples gain from criss-cross 
writing? If I am right, criss-cross writing must go well together with the use of 
examples – Wittgenstein’s method ‘by examples’ (PI, §133) must actually demand 
something like criss-cross writing. To begin with, rather than theses and 
definitions, the concrete case is the focus of the Wittgensteinian investigation: 
philosophy should respond to philosophical troubles by attending to the specific 
contexts of concepts and expressions: the specifics of our linguistic practices. This 
will often make us see that it is not one problem we are dealing with, though the 
use of one and the same expression may have suggested this. Our everyday 
practices most often cannot be captured by general definitions, and the sort of 
generality they exhibit is better characterized by ‘a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (PI §66). Now, the more philosophy 
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lets itself be driven by a focus on the particular, on the concrete case and the 
concrete example, the more it will have to take on a criss-cross rather than a linear 
form. The criss-cross form provides the example with the space it needs to unfold, 
and also protects its place as a concretization of criss-crossing language and 
concept use. The criss-cross is required to mirror and map, in adequately 
responsive ways, a terrain that is itself not like a jigsaw puzzle but is rather 
dynamic and characterized by open-endedness, changing context-dependency and a 
simultaneous multiplicity of viewpoints. Giving adequate room to the example with 
all its facets has as a consequence that the philosopher deviates from the linearity 
and obedience to the ideal of linear Gestaltbildung and instead aims to produce a 
criss-cross gestalt. This yields a different tempo and mood to the performance of 
philosophy. In academic philosophy, it is standard that examples are used to either 
support or refute a thesis in an argument. But Wittgenstein’s use of examples also 
includes a different role:  
… there is another way of using examples in which reflecting on cases 
becomes part of the work of clarification itself. This happens when we do not 
know where we are going, or when we think we know but the example takes 
us by surprise. I would suggest being open to this possibility is tremendously 
important in philosophy, since it is what enables us to make new discoveries; 
it is very hard too, since it means being prepared to relinquish our control 
over where the line of thought is taking us. (Hertzberg, 2006, p.91)  
The focus on examples helps to resist the temptation to put an end to the 
investigation by a thesis:  
… the way out of philosophical bewilderment is to relinquish the ambition to 
formulate certain ideas that will provide a solution to it. … 
We should let ourselves be taught by the examples rather than use the 
examples as illustrations of preconceived solutions. In doing so we must 
relinquish our control of the process of investigations. (ibid., Abstract)  
Thus, examples are for Wittgenstein also a ‘way to slow down’, to resist the 
tendencies to follow one line of thought, to head for the thesis. Employing the 
method of examples himself with his own students, Hertzberg observes: ‘having to 
look for examples, they feel, slows them down, does not let them get where they 
want to go, or only gets them there by a detour.’ (ibid., p.91).  
According to Ortner, a key feature of the syncretistic is that it is opposed to 
linear-discursive writing: ‘Ich verwende den Begriff synkretistisch als Gegenbegriff 
zu linear geordnet-fortschreibend-diskursiv.’ (Ortner, 2000, p.496). The opposition 
between the linear and the criss-cross is discussed in the PI preface, where 
Wittgenstein refers to his earlier ideal of linearity (‘… the essential thing was that 
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the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and 
without breaks’). He states that, first, he could not put the ideal of linearity into 
practice, second, that this had an important fundamentum in re: in the subject 
matter of (his) philosophy. The Brown Book was the attempt at the linear form, the 
form without breaks; the PI the attempt at the criss-cross form – that has to have 
breaks. In The Brown Book Wittgenstein was still trying to put to work what he had 
at one point programmatically declared as an aim in The Big Typescript – to do 
things one after the other (TS 213,432r[4]): ‘First you have to start by examining 
one thing after another methodically, and in complete peace …’ (BT, p.316e). But 
the PI made use of the criss-cross instead. From the perspective of the PI, The 
Brown Book therefore gave a wrong example of how to do philosophy with 
examples. It was not its many examples of language-games and simple uses of 
language that were wrong, but its overall procedure and approach. The Brown Book 
demonstrated and taught philosophy as an activity that was – as far as possible – 
linear rather than criss-cross. It is appreciated by many for precisely this, but 
Wittgenstein himself is clearly not among them. Wittgenstein deliberately chose a 
criss-crossing form in order to give space to a view of philosophy that takes as 
much as possible into account the dynamics and multiplicity of language. At this 
point, where the meaning of ‘example’ as a sample to be imitated, whether in 
ordinary life or in philosophy, makes its powerful first appearance, the discourse 
about Wittgenstein’s writing and the discourse about the role of the example in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy merge. 
Ortner presents Wittgenstein as someone who failed to achieve linearity and 
complete the puzzle, while I have presented Wittgenstein as someone who 
challenges these ideals in philosophy and wants to promote and defend alternatives 
to them. But Ortner’s approach is in no way exceptional or different from what one 
should expect; in fact, it is typical and representative not only of our understanding 
of science and scholarship in general, but even of the standard approach to 
Wittgenstein’s work. Thus, if someone is in the minority, it is not Ortner, but 
Wittgenstein. Ortner in fact gives apt expression to a view of knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition that is dominant: philosophical problems and philosophical 
knowledge are similar to scientific problems and scientific knowledge. In the 
search for such knowledge, puzzle writing is an adequate response. On the other 
hand, Wittgenstein defends and promotes a view of philosophy which is the exact 
opposite of what Ortner uses in order to measure his (Wittgenstein’s) success. This 
conception of philosophy demands procedures and strategies which differ 
fundamentally from puzzle writing and indeed oppose it. While it may be correct to 
say that science is puzzle-solving, philosophy according to the PI is not, and 
philosophical problems according to the PI are not like jigsaw puzzles. Writing 
pursues knowledge, be it through sharing, expanding and explicating, or by 
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creating it, and writing strategies are ways to focus, organize and enlarge the 
writing process so that writing does its job well in the pursuit of knowledge 
(Ortner, 2000, p.347ff). Each strategy has its assets and drawbacks, depending on 
the specific needs and contexts of writing. Linear writing is good at organizing and 
sharing knowledge that is under control; puzzle writing is good at acquiring 
knowledge of a domain that is closed, but not yet fully discovered and under 
control. Syncretistic strategy is best for creating knowledge and moving in a terrain 
that is in continuous flux and open-ended. It is the opposite of a strategy for 
knowledge depiction and organization (ibid., p.537). It is task-seeking and task-
producing before task realization (ibid., p.538). This is the strategy in which the PI 
was written. However, the criss-cross was not only discovered by Wittgenstein in 
autumn 1936; it had been practiced by him before, but in The Brown Book period 
had been put aside in favor of linearity (Pichler, 2013). The criss-cross had actually 
been described as an ideal and opposed to the spirit of the ‘typical Western 
scientist’ as early as in the drafts for a preface from November 1930 (CV, p.8ff). 
According to Wittgenstein, the typical Western scientist aims at progress, after 
(linearly) erecting stone by stone a steadfast building; while he, Wittgenstein, aims 
at making the foundations for any possible building transparent by approaching 
(criss-cross) the same points over and over again from different directions: ‘Each 
sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, the same thing over 
and over again & it is as though they were | they are as it were views of one object 
seen from different angles.’ (CV, p.9e). As he later says in the PI: his investigations 
are directed ‘not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 
‘possibilities’ of phenomena’ (PI, §90). And in PI §125: the aim of philosophy is 
not to resolve contradictions by means of a discovery, but to make it possible for us 
to get a clear view of the states of affairs that trouble us before the contradictions 
are resolved. This approach contrasts, according to Wittgenstein, heavily with the 
Western idea of how science and scholarship should be carried out: ‘It is all one to 
me whether the typical Western scientist understands or appreciates my work since 
in any case he does not understand the spirit in which I write … So I am aiming at 
something different than are the scientists & my thoughts move differently than do 
theirs.’ (CV, p.9e). If progress (of the ‘Western’ kind just described) is the form of 
thought which Wittgenstein opposes, then the envisaged book which he speaks 
about in these preface drafts must have a form which in an important sense opposes 
(that kind of) progress. If (this kind of) progress is linked to linear-discursiveness, 
then his book cannot be linear-discursive. 
We have to distinguish ‘criss-cross’ from ‘cross-wise’ philosophy. In The 
Big Typescript Wittgenstein recommends undertaking (finite) 
‘Querstreifenphilosophie’ rather than (infinite) ‘Längsstreifenphilosophie’ (TS 
213,431r[4]et432r[1]): 




Unrest in philosophy comes from philosophers looking at, seeing, 
philosophy all wrong, namely, as cut up into (infinite) vertical strips 
[Längsstreifen], as it were, rather than into (finite) horizontal strips 
[Querstreifen]. This change in understanding creates the greatest difficulty. 
They want to grasp the infinite strip, as it were, and they complain that this is 
not possible piece by piece. Of course it isn’t, if by ‘a piece’ one understands 
an endless vertical strip [Längsstreifen]. But it is, if one sees a horizontal 
strip [Querstreifen] as a whole, definitive piece. – But then we’ll never get 
finished with our work! Certainly not, because it doesn’t have an end. (BT, 
p.316e)8 
 
‘Querstreifenphilosophie’ is cross-wise rather than criss-cross philosophy and as 
such well described by Cora Diamond: ‘I am arguing for a different understanding 
of Wittgenstein’s later ideas about philosophical clarification, taking seriously the 
remark from The Big Typescript (also in Zettel), that what makes the greatest 
difficulty in philosophy is the kind of reordering of our understanding that enables 
us to see philosophy as cross-strips, each of them a whole definite piece.’ 
(Diamond, 2004, p.210). Cross-wise philosophy permits dealing with philosophical 
problems piecemeal, doing philosophy in ‘cross-strips’. It permits ‘calm 
progression’, ‘Möglichkeit des ruhigen Fortschreitens’ (TS 213,431r[1]). But this is 
not the form of progression that the 1930 preface drafts and the PI preface are after. 
Both ‘Längsstreifenphilosophie’ and ‘Querstreifenphilosophie’ are at odds with the 
PI’s vision of philosophy as criss-cross. Though cross-wise philosophy allows us 
‘to see our problem as a particular problem, not as the problem, not as an infinitely 
long lengthwise strip’ (Diamond, 2004, p.213), it still permits us to see it as ‘a 
whole definite piece’ (ibid., p.217). It treats philosophical problems as though they 
were open to treatment in little slices. While with cross-wise philosophy one can in 
principle still do anti-essentialist philosophy ‘by examples’, it is not this sort of 
anti-essentialist philosophy the PI promotes: the PI continuously indicates that the 
issues are so interlinked that they cannot be dealt with separately, one at a time. 
There exists no ‘wholesale method for dealing with philosophical propositions’ 
(ibid., p.203), neither for criss-cross nor for cross-wise philosophy, but according to 
the former the parts of the philosophical problem are no longer to be conceived as 
‘whole definite’ pieces. Cross-wise philosophy permits us to say ‘done with that’, 
but coming to say such a thing in philosophy seems impermissible from the 
perspective of the PI. The philosophical problem can be dealt with neither all at 
once, once and for all, nor in small slices. This makes philosophy come back to the 
same piece over and over again. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein it is 
necessarily repetitive and iterative.  
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Criss-cross procedure is opposed to linear strategy, puzzle strategy, length-
wise philosophy and cross-wise philosophy. With the linear Brown Book strategy 
you will, after having reached step 5 in the process, not question step 3 – that step 
will remain untouched. This is comparable to using a ladder: when you have 
climbed up to rung 5 you do not question rung 2; rather, you presuppose that rung 2 
was needed and is still in place. It is also comparable to the jigsaw puzzle where the 
pieces ‘already put in their place’ are not moved and do not change their shape or 
position when further pieces are added: no placing of any future piece will change 
the piece already placed if it was placed correctly. Cross-wise procedure is 
linearity- and puzzle strategy-compliant. In contrast, criss-cross procedure comes 
back to and questions the same thing over and over again: 
Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me. 
One movement constructs & takes (in hand) one stone after another, | picks 
up one stone after another the other keeps reaching for the same one. (CV, 
p.10e) 
Thomas Kuhn makes a distinction between normal scientific puzzle-solving on the 
one hand and philosophical problem-solving on the other (see Kuhn 1962, ch.IV, 
and Conant, 2009). Scientific puzzles have a solution, and when trying to solve the 
puzzle, one knows and expects that there is a solution. The puzzle-solver is just 
doing what anyone else with the same expertise can also do, namely finding the 
solution, putting the puzzle together. But things are different with philosophical 
problems, or where scientific puzzles become philosophical problems: while 
puzzle-solving, puzzle writing and the jigsaw puzzle picture may be characteristic 
of science, they are not for philosophy as it is conceived by the PI. 
The PI was intended to give an example of criss-cross rather than linear 
philosophy. The criss-cross seems for the PI a minimal requirement, a necessary 
element for doing philosophy. Independent of whether we agree that the subject of 
philosophy is indeed criss-cross, or rather think like ‘typical Western scientists’: 
the author of the PI had this view, and the formation of the PI took its direction 
from it – we should acknowledge this. Whether we ourselves can do philosophy in 
Wittgenstein’s spirit is a different question. Criss-cross form alone does not seem 
sufficient to make philosophy successful (i.e. to make the philosophical problems 
disappear, cf. PI, §133). Therefore, even if we wanted to do criss-cross philosophy 
in the PI’s spirit, we may still not be able to. We may lack knowledge and mastery 
of the more refined principles of the criss-cross that organize the text and thought 
of the PI. I myself do not feel I have satisfactorily recognized and understood the 
principles of PI composition. I do not see the more detailed pattern although I can 
see the criss-cross gestalt. What is it that drives the detailed text selection and 
sequence? It would be a mistake to think that the PI’s criss-cross form was the 
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result of arbitrary putting-together, a conglomerate. The PI does not have no 
structure, but rather a specific structure, a result of composition and planning 
(strategy 5). When composing his PI, Wittgenstein clearly did not pick just 
anything from the earlier manuscripts and typescripts – though they all contained 
examples of doing philosophy. He made specific selections; he also selected texts 
from the Brown Book complex. Why did he pick this specific example? For what 
reasons did he omit that group of remarks over there? Why did he move from this 
topic to that topic? Neither should one think that the PI’s focus on the particular 
and concrete rules out the possibility that the clarifications offered by the text have 
general applicability. How much of the PI’s composition tried to deal with exactly 
this challenge, namely achieving a balance between the attention to the particular 
and the ambition of making the insights acquired applicable to other cases? Getting 
closer to an answer to these questions will probably also bring us closer to 
understanding why Wittgenstein in the end was still dissatisfied with what he had 
achieved in the PI.  
There is yet another feature of the PI that I find difficult to grasp: in contrast 
to The Brown Book, the PI includes a great number of, and partly groups together, 
metaphilosophical remarks such as §133. How does this fit the PI’s spirit of 
working by example rather than meta-discourse? If philosophy can also be taught 
by example (PI, §133), why do we need accompanying ‘meta-hints’ and 
philosophical theory? Is the demonstration by example itself not sufficient after all? 
In my 2013, I connected the syncretistic/criss-cross to poetic and literary aspects 
and related it to Wittgenstein’s saying that philosophy should at least partly be 
performed in the manner of ‘Dichtung’ (CV, p.28). One feature of ‘Dichtung’ is 
that, though it can be ‘belehrend’ (didactic), it will not produce ‘Lehrbücher’ 
(textbooks). Lehrbücher are characterized by explicit language, and they also make 
the spirit in which they are conducted explicit. Wittgenstein’s philosophy does not 
aim to produce Lehrbücher (see also the preface to the Tractatus) and, according to 
the 1930 preface drafts, strives not to make the spirit in which it is conducted 
explicit either (CV, p.11). But isn’t this exactly what the PI’s metaphilosophical 
remarks do, at least in part: make the spirit explicit? These are not unimportant 
questions, or mere biographical or philological issues. If Wittgenstein was right in 
believing (he also had doubts) that there is something valuable to be learned from 
his way of doing philosophy, from the specific selection of examples he gives us 
and the specific form in which the examples are composed together into his PI 
example of doing philosophy, then it seems important that we recognize what this 
way consisted in: we have to understand his more detailed principles for doing this 
and that. Recognizing that the PI is criss-cross does not seem sufficient by itself. 
But while we seem to need more than this, the ‘more’ cannot be principles of 
linearity or completeness, he says. 
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Wittgenstein was doubtful about the success of his work: whether someone 
would understand his way of doing philosophy and manage or even want to apply it 
on their own: to follow his example. In this chapter I did not want to criticize the 
standards or conceptions of philosophy that Wittgenstein opposes. My chapter 
conforms to those standards rather than Wittgenstein’s (however, one might say 
that my chapter is not philosophy). But I wanted to stress a point that was made 
early on by Wittgenstein, but today often seems to be forgotten or 
underacknowledged: Wittgenstein challenges our Western academic traditions not 
only in matters of content and conceptions, but even more so, it seems to me, in 
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1 I have benefited a lot from the following literature about the role of the example 
for Wittgenstein: Marcuschi, 1976; Johannessen, 1988; Janik, 2002 and 2006; 
Hertzberg, 2006; Kuusela, 2008; Nordenstam, 2009; Savickey, 2011. Regarding 
Wittgenstein’s own discussion and references to examples, see in particular PI, §§ 
71–77, 133, 208–210, 593. 
2 This was one of the main points of the later Wittgenstein’s critique of the 
Tractatus; see MN: 6.2.1933; AWL, p.11; MAM: pp.58, 70; PI, §§23, 114; RPP I, 
§38. 
3 The central passages are: ‘But the essential thing was that the thoughts should 
proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks. [linear 
step-by-step writing] … After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results 
together into such a whole [puzzle writing], I realized that I should never succeed. 
… And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For 
this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.’ 
[criss-cross writing] 
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4 To this project belong MS 141 (1933–34), TS 310 (1934–35), the second part of 
MS 115 (1936) and also some items from the Skinner archives (see Gibson, 2010). 
When I refer to The Brown Book, I mostly mean all these items. 
5 This is a slightly revised version of a sentence in my piece for Nuno Venturinha’s 
(ed.) The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which was 
first published by Routledge in 2013. 
6 Ortner identifies eight features of the syncretistic (2000, p.505ff.); for a detailed 
discussion of these features and their possible application to Wittgenstein, see 
Pichler, 2013. 
7 The act of critical reading is little discussed by Ortner in this context. For a 
comprehensive study of authors and works read and referred to by Wittgenstein, 
see Biesenbach, 2014. 
8 The English translation of Wittgenstein’s ‘Längsstreifen’ vs. ‘Querstreifen’ 
analogy can be confusing since in German both kinds of strips can run horizontally 
or vertically. The main point of the analogy is to distinguish finite strips from strips 
running infinitely; this point is supported by the analogy that contrasts 
‘Querstreifen’ with ‘Längsstreifen’, the first always running ‘in Querrichtung’ 
which is defined as being shorter than the ‘Längsrichtung’. 
9 Earlier versions of this material have been presented at conferences in Jena (2012, 
org. Jens Loescher, Jutta Heinz and Olaf Breidbach), Lisbon (2013, org. Nuno 
Venturinha) and Göttingen (2013, org. Sebastian Greve and James Conant). I am 
indebted to comments and discussion at these conferences, and to the scholarly and 
financial support of the Portuguese FCT-funded project, ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations: Re-Evaluating a Project (2010–12)’, directed by Nuno 
Venturinha. For valuable comments and encouragement I would in particular like 
to thank Allan Janik, Bill Child, James Conant, Edmund Dain, Sebastian Greve, 
Harald Johannessen, Jens Loescher, Merete Mazzarella, Tore Nordenstam and 
Nuno Venturinha. 
